Never forget! Here's to the Heroes of September 11th, to those who lost loved ones that fateful day, and to the military and first responders who protect our lives and livelihoods every day. And let us not forget the leadership of Mayor Rudy Giuliani and President George W. Bush in the immediate aftermath of the attack. To all who acted with bravery, courage and resolve during unspeakable tragedy, you have the respect and admiration of a grateful nation. God bless America!
Sunday, September 11, 2011
Sunday, June 27, 2010
Taking charge (pun intended) of your credit score
A year or so ago I went to a free presentation sponsored by the Overland Park (KS) Keller Williams office. The presenter, Rick Woodruff of Metropolitan Mortgage, explained how the US credit bureaus interpret credit activities and assign scores. Since that time, I have had numerous opportunities to assist clients in my role as a personal banker with understanding some of the basics to understanding credit. A couple of nights ago, I found my notes from that presentation and decided to summarize them and add a bit of commentary. I hope someone who reads this will find this a valuable addition to your financial/credit strategy. Although I am not an expert on the subject, feel free to pose any questions you might have. I welcome opportunities to go out and find answers.
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---What You Need To Know About Credit Scores---
FICO scores range from 300-850
The difference in costs between having a 760 or higher versus a 620-639 is astronomical. One recent example I saw resulted in $92,000 more in interest over a 30- year mortgage on a $100,000 purchase price.
The reason rates are lower for people with higher interest rates is that financial institutions see fewer delinquencies and defaults when high credit scores are present. Statistics show those with credit scores…
…higher than 800 will average only 1 default out of 100
…between 750-799 will average 2 defaults out of 100
…between 700-749 will average 5 defaults out of 100
…between 650-699 will average 14 defaults out of 100
Credit scores are composed of the following four measurements:
Length of history – 15%
Payment history – 35%
Amount owed – 30 %
Credit type – 10%
Length of history is worth 15 percent of the score. The longer an account has remained open, the more positive impact it can have, assuming the positives are not outweighed by late payments, defaults, etc. This is one reason it may not be advisable to close an account just because it is not being used. By closing it, the positive benefits to the credit score will eventually disappear – not to mention there will be a temporary hit on the score that accompanies the closing of a revolving credit account.
Payment history is weighted the highest at 35%. Make at least the minimum payments on time, every time, and this measurement can be your best friend. Have too many late payments, delinquencies or defaults show on your credit and they will remain on your credit for 7-10 years, depending on the type.
Amount owed, or credit utilization, also impacts credit scores significantly at 30% of the weighted average. Credit utilization is the amount owed as a percentage of the credit extended. If $2000 is owed on a total credit limit of $5000, this puts the credit utilization at 40 percent.
...If credit utilization is from 0-9 percent, no points are deducted from the credit score.
...If credit utilization is between 10-19 percent, 15 points are deducted.
...If credit utilization is between 20-29 percent, 25 points are deducted.
...If credit utilization is between 30-39 percent, 30 points are deducted.
...If credit utilization is between 40-49 percent, 40 points are deducted
...If credit utilization is between 50-69 percent, 75 points are deducted
...If credit utilization is between 70-89 percent, 85 points are deducted
...If credit utilization is between 90-99 percent, 100 points are deducted.
...If credit utilization is at 100 percent, 105 points are deducted.
As is evident from the above figures, it is very important to manage the amount of credit used on a monthly basis. Credit scores could wildly fluctuate if one month 10% of the credit limit is being used, with 70% being used the following month.
Credit type is given a 10% weighting. The best scores are awarded to those who have a mix of revolving accounts, installment accounts, and perhaps a mortgage.
---Tips To Improve Credit Scores---
Pay at least the minimum amount by the due date at the latest. Utilize automatic ACH payments or your bank’s online bill pay to reduce the chance that you will forget to schedule a payment.
Request a limit increase on your revolving accounts. If you keep your spending at the same levels, this increase will lower your overall credit utilization, which should raise your score. NEVER request your limits to be lowered as this will increase your credit utilization and drop your credit score (like a rock).
Verify all your credit accounts are reporting a credit limit. Some credit card companies will not report your credit limit, which can have serious impact on your credit.
---Mistakes To Avoid---
Closing old accounts or revolving accounts – your score will take a hit and you will eventually lose the benefit of the positive history.
Transferring your credit card balance to a new, lower rate card. Depending on how you do it, you could take three hits to your credit score: closing the old account, opening a new account, and a high credit utilization rate on the new card (we often are unsure how much credit will be extended until we receive the card in the mail).
Applying for credit jointly or being a co-signer. If the other person fails to manage the debt properly, makes late payments, maximizes the card, etc., there is no way to extricate your credit score from the situation.
Failing to pull your credit for fear of dropping your score. Seven inquiries are built in to the FICO model annually and the hit to your credit score after those seven is minimal.
Not obtaining new credit after a bankruptcy, a foreclosure, a tax lien or a bill turned over to collection.
...Late payments and collection accounts affect credit for 7 years.
...Chapter 7, 11, and 12 bankruptcies affect credit for 10 years.
...Defaulted government debts affect credit for 15 years.
Trying to live without any kind of credit product. At some point in your life, you will almost certainly need credit. Credit scores cannot be built in a day. They can only be built by opening accounts, staying within your means, building a history of paying on time, and utilizing the various types of available credit.
Saturday, April 19, 2008
Book Review: America at the Crossroads (Francis Fukuyama)
Fukuyama’s “Realistic Wilsonianism:” Foreign Policy Model or Therapeutic Exercise? [Review written in July 2006]
America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy. By Francis Fukuyama. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 226p.
In America at the Crossroads, Francis Fukuyama details his rationale for abandoning neoconservatism, provides analysis of the “neoconservative” mishandling of the Iraq War, and posits a new American foreign policy incorporating the best of neoconservative thinking with other existing theories of international relations. Fukuyama implies in his preface that he has two important motives for authoring this work: first, he can no longer be party to the tainted ideology of neoconservatism, and second, he seeks to introduce a new foreign policy model not currently represented in American politics. Although much of his analysis is informative and compelling, Fukuyama ultimately seems distracted by his first proposition and falls short in delivering anything significantly new to the foreign policy debate.
For Fukuyama, the Iraq War symbolized a line of demarcation between his own conception of neoconservative values and the neoconservative establishment. Convinced that the connection between neoconservatism and the Bush administration’s war policy is overstated, he nevertheless believes that because the term is inextricably linked to the administration’s conduct of the war, it is beyond rescue. As a result, he worries that a backlash against the neoconservative agenda will inspire a wholesale return to a realist foreign policy, a prospect he deems inconsistent with the emerging international system. In an effort to prevent this return to realism as the modus operandi in American foreign policy, Fukuyama proposes the model of “realistic Wilsonianism,” a spin-off of neoconservative thought designed to keep America engaged in world affairs while avoiding further alienation in the international community by an overuse of military might. (Preface, Chapters 1, 6-7)
In essence, Fukuyama’s new model begins where neoconservative thought left off, proposing that the internal actions of states – not just their external behavior – are important, that American power is often needed to bring about moral purposes, and that social engineering ought to be approached with great care and humility. The sole neoconservative principle he omits from his model is the traditional skepticism for the potential of international institutions to play a viable role in the promotion of both security and justice. In fact, this tendency towards liberal internationalism is the only major discrepancy between Fukuyama’s “realistic Wilsonianism” and the neoconservatism he claims is no longer viable. Thus, the main difference between neoconservative thinking and the “realistic Wilsonianism” model is that the means by which these goals can be achieved are less dependent on American military power and more reliant upon US influence to help shape international institutions. (Chapters 1, 7)
Part of what Fukuyama envisions in his foreign policy model is a “dramatic demilitarization” of American foreign policy, a toning down of “the war on terrorism” rhetoric, and a wholehearted campaign to promote political and economic development throughout the world – the last which he claims has always been an afterthought of US foreign policy. He seems concerned that unfettered US military power, combined with aggressive democracy promotion tactics such as regime change and nation-building, will lead to a decline of American influence in the world. To counteract this potentially undesirable loss of American prestige, Fukuyama believes it is essential that US policymakers not only support current international institutions, but also that they create new organizations, coalitions, and institutions to meet a broad range of potential needs for the future. (Chapter 6-7)
Fukuyama’s focus on international institutions is interesting given his own admission of the conundrum of political legitimacy, the idea that formal international institutions perceived as legitimate are hopelessly inefficient while efficient forms of international cooperation often lack legitimacy. This apparent drawback to institutions does not dissuade him from proposing a foreign policy agenda of “multi-multilateralism,” defined as “a large number of overlapping and sometimes competitive international institutions.” (158) His main argument for this approach is couched in the belief that more institutions will provide policymakers with more options, citing as an example the US collaborating with NATO when Russia vetoed action against Kosovo in the UN Security Council. On this basis, Fukuyama calls for a “multiplicity of organizations” in order to be prepared for all different types of challenges to world order in the future. (Chapter 6)
It is clear that Fukuyama’s explanation of “realistic Wilsonianism” is a cohesive and comprehensive foreign policy strategy worthy of consideration. What is less clear, and appears hard to defend, is his claim that he is offering a model “not captured by any existing schools within the US foreign policy debate” when the majority of his principles are supplied by the ideology he supposedly is abandoning, and additional principles are “borrowed” from existing theories. In this respect, it seems he has confused adoption with creation, and adaptation with innovation. Another problematic feature is his apparent failure to explain the logic for his transformation on the issue of international institutions. Prior to the Iraq War, Fukuyama presumably held a more pessimistic view towards the value of international institutions; nevertheless, while he deftly outlines his disagreements with the war, he fails to explain how the Iraq War altered his views of institutions. This begs the question, on what basis did the Iraq War change his opinion and what exactly was so compelling that it warranted a new foreign policy model? Because this rationale is missing, so also is an important analytical tool for assessing the merits of his policy.
Although academics and policy makers alike may profit from a reading of Fukuyama’s book, the likely beneficiaries of America at the Crossroads will be students with little knowledge of the neoconservative tradition, political partisans who are intrigued by the critique of neoconservatism from a former “neocon,” and perhaps, political moderates seeking a fair assessment of the Bush administration’s conduct of the Iraq War. For readers in these categories there will be substantial “food for thought,” but those expecting to encounter a brand new foreign policy model may well be disappointed. Given the disconnect between what the author claims to be doing (creating a new foreign policy) and what he is actually doing (borrowing from existing foreign policies) one wonders whether Fukuyama, horrified by the aggressive policies of his neoconservative colleagues, simply needed a therapeutic venue to exorcise his own demons.
America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy. By Francis Fukuyama. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 226p.
In America at the Crossroads, Francis Fukuyama details his rationale for abandoning neoconservatism, provides analysis of the “neoconservative” mishandling of the Iraq War, and posits a new American foreign policy incorporating the best of neoconservative thinking with other existing theories of international relations. Fukuyama implies in his preface that he has two important motives for authoring this work: first, he can no longer be party to the tainted ideology of neoconservatism, and second, he seeks to introduce a new foreign policy model not currently represented in American politics. Although much of his analysis is informative and compelling, Fukuyama ultimately seems distracted by his first proposition and falls short in delivering anything significantly new to the foreign policy debate.
For Fukuyama, the Iraq War symbolized a line of demarcation between his own conception of neoconservative values and the neoconservative establishment. Convinced that the connection between neoconservatism and the Bush administration’s war policy is overstated, he nevertheless believes that because the term is inextricably linked to the administration’s conduct of the war, it is beyond rescue. As a result, he worries that a backlash against the neoconservative agenda will inspire a wholesale return to a realist foreign policy, a prospect he deems inconsistent with the emerging international system. In an effort to prevent this return to realism as the modus operandi in American foreign policy, Fukuyama proposes the model of “realistic Wilsonianism,” a spin-off of neoconservative thought designed to keep America engaged in world affairs while avoiding further alienation in the international community by an overuse of military might. (Preface, Chapters 1, 6-7)
In essence, Fukuyama’s new model begins where neoconservative thought left off, proposing that the internal actions of states – not just their external behavior – are important, that American power is often needed to bring about moral purposes, and that social engineering ought to be approached with great care and humility. The sole neoconservative principle he omits from his model is the traditional skepticism for the potential of international institutions to play a viable role in the promotion of both security and justice. In fact, this tendency towards liberal internationalism is the only major discrepancy between Fukuyama’s “realistic Wilsonianism” and the neoconservatism he claims is no longer viable. Thus, the main difference between neoconservative thinking and the “realistic Wilsonianism” model is that the means by which these goals can be achieved are less dependent on American military power and more reliant upon US influence to help shape international institutions. (Chapters 1, 7)
Part of what Fukuyama envisions in his foreign policy model is a “dramatic demilitarization” of American foreign policy, a toning down of “the war on terrorism” rhetoric, and a wholehearted campaign to promote political and economic development throughout the world – the last which he claims has always been an afterthought of US foreign policy. He seems concerned that unfettered US military power, combined with aggressive democracy promotion tactics such as regime change and nation-building, will lead to a decline of American influence in the world. To counteract this potentially undesirable loss of American prestige, Fukuyama believes it is essential that US policymakers not only support current international institutions, but also that they create new organizations, coalitions, and institutions to meet a broad range of potential needs for the future. (Chapter 6-7)
Fukuyama’s focus on international institutions is interesting given his own admission of the conundrum of political legitimacy, the idea that formal international institutions perceived as legitimate are hopelessly inefficient while efficient forms of international cooperation often lack legitimacy. This apparent drawback to institutions does not dissuade him from proposing a foreign policy agenda of “multi-multilateralism,” defined as “a large number of overlapping and sometimes competitive international institutions.” (158) His main argument for this approach is couched in the belief that more institutions will provide policymakers with more options, citing as an example the US collaborating with NATO when Russia vetoed action against Kosovo in the UN Security Council. On this basis, Fukuyama calls for a “multiplicity of organizations” in order to be prepared for all different types of challenges to world order in the future. (Chapter 6)
It is clear that Fukuyama’s explanation of “realistic Wilsonianism” is a cohesive and comprehensive foreign policy strategy worthy of consideration. What is less clear, and appears hard to defend, is his claim that he is offering a model “not captured by any existing schools within the US foreign policy debate” when the majority of his principles are supplied by the ideology he supposedly is abandoning, and additional principles are “borrowed” from existing theories. In this respect, it seems he has confused adoption with creation, and adaptation with innovation. Another problematic feature is his apparent failure to explain the logic for his transformation on the issue of international institutions. Prior to the Iraq War, Fukuyama presumably held a more pessimistic view towards the value of international institutions; nevertheless, while he deftly outlines his disagreements with the war, he fails to explain how the Iraq War altered his views of institutions. This begs the question, on what basis did the Iraq War change his opinion and what exactly was so compelling that it warranted a new foreign policy model? Because this rationale is missing, so also is an important analytical tool for assessing the merits of his policy.
Although academics and policy makers alike may profit from a reading of Fukuyama’s book, the likely beneficiaries of America at the Crossroads will be students with little knowledge of the neoconservative tradition, political partisans who are intrigued by the critique of neoconservatism from a former “neocon,” and perhaps, political moderates seeking a fair assessment of the Bush administration’s conduct of the Iraq War. For readers in these categories there will be substantial “food for thought,” but those expecting to encounter a brand new foreign policy model may well be disappointed. Given the disconnect between what the author claims to be doing (creating a new foreign policy) and what he is actually doing (borrowing from existing foreign policies) one wonders whether Fukuyama, horrified by the aggressive policies of his neoconservative colleagues, simply needed a therapeutic venue to exorcise his own demons.
In assessing his historical narrative of neoconservative roots, his analysis of the misapplication of neoconservative principles in the Iraq War, and his criticisms of US insulation from international sentiment, it is clear that Fukuyama’s initial objective to overtly split from neoconservatism has been realized. On the other hand, far from presenting an essential new foreign policy model for the consideration of the academic and policy-making community, Fukuyama has really just done what moderate and independent-minded Americans do all the time. He has considered what the “smorgasbord of ideologies” has to offer and has piecemealed together a foreign policy strategy that he believes is more viable. There is little doubt he has done a better job than most would, but what remains is little more than a stepchild of neoconservatism, not the cutting edge foreign policy model he promised.
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
The Guatemalan Immersion Experience
From time to time, I am asked about my experience with Spanish language immersion programs in Guatemala. Now that I have finally joined the rest of the world in blogging, I have gone to my email archives to give my readers a flavor of what it is like to live and study in Guatemala. For those of you who were not aware, I actually studied in Guatemala on two occasions, once as a college student in 1991-’92, and again in 2001 immediately after returning from Japan. The six months I spent in Guatemala were split between two cities: I studied in Antigua for 3 ½ months and Xela for 2 months.
Antigua is by far the most common destination for language students – and perhaps the better choice for someone wanting to ease their way into language study. But it truly depends on your personality and motivations. If you want the immersion experience, you can certainly avoid the foreign hangouts where your native language is likely to be spoken. For the student who desires fewer opportunities to use English, Xela is a fantastic alternative if you can stand the altitude (Xela is the two-mile high city).
ABOUT ANTIGUA
“I am living in the town of Antigua, which is located about 1400-1500 meters above sea level. The climate is perfect here, with the daily temperatures between 15-27 degrees Celsius year round. Antigua is surrounded by three beautiful volcanoes, none which are active. The streets of Antigua are made of cobblestone. For this reason speed zone signs are unnecessary. If you go too fast, you will tear your car apart! The buildings in the town are painted in various bright colors. Interspersed with these beautiful colors are the ruins of many large buildings and churches. In its history, Antigua has been destroyed in whole or in part three different times by earthquakes and volcanoes. Hopefully, that won't occur again while I am here:)”
LIVING EXPENSES
“If any of you are thinking about learning Spanish, Guatemala provides one of the best values in the world for language instruction.” “I am studying at a language school 6 hours a day, 5 days a week with a personal instructor. I am on a budget of about 4000 yen per week [$33] after my housing and schooling expenses. In Antigua, I paid about 7000 yen per week [$58] for housing, which included three meals a day, six days a week… The cost for schooling varies according to the number of hours you study per week. In Antigua, I paid about 14,000 yen per week [$116] for 30 hours of one on one instruction. So I guess my weekly expenses totaled about 25,000 yen [or $208]. I might add that schooling and housing expenses are about 25-30 percent cheaper in Xela,” so it is possible to enjoy a high quality total immersion experience for even less if you are willing to move further into the mountains.
ACTIVITIES
There are many things to do in (or near) Antigua in addition to language studies. Some of the possibilities include the following:
- Climbing volcanoes (both active and dead)
- Hiking (another word for climbing:)
- Renting bikes/motorbikes and hitting the trails (Be warned - lots of mountains)
- Learning how to dance the Salsa and Merengue (The advantage of choosing this is that at least you aren't climbing:)
- Weekend trips to the coast/beach (Lots of black sand beaches here due to underwater volcanic activity.)
- Visiting ancient Mayan ruins (These are generally weekend trips.)
- Traveling to other nearby Central American and North American countries such as El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico.
- If all else fails, hang out in the Central Park. It always provides a very comfortable environment to practice Spanish.
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
“After 8 weeks of living in Antigua I finally decided to move on to other experiences. I took one week off in my studies in order to travel to Honduras. My first stop there was in Copan, the site of one of the most famous and best-preserved Mayan ruins. I hired a tour guide and spent the day touring the site. The Mayans had great civilizations in Central America long before Europe discovered the Americas. They had a system of writing using pictures, which could be compared with kanji or perhaps the Egyptian hieroglyphics. There are still many statues that bear beautiful characters of the language.
After a couple of days in Copan, I went northwest and spent some time at the beach in the little town of Omoa. There wasn't much to do or to see there, but I was able to visit a very large Spanish fort. The fort was built to fight against British pirates who would intercept Spanish ships loaded with all sorts of products, steal the plunder and escape back to Britain as heroes. Ironically, by the time the fort was completed, the time for pirating had nearly passed. The fort, which was built to house 2000 soldiers, never had more than 200. On one occasion, the British captured the fort, but left hurriedly in the middle of the night when they heard that Spanish forces were marching toward the town in great numbers."
LAST THOUGHTS
I mentioned earlier that I have studied on two different occasions in Guatemala. If I get the chance, there will be a third! You simply cannot beat the value or the experience. For anyone who is thinking about pursuing a Spanish language immersion program, I will be happy to share my knowledge of Antigua and Xela or answer any questions you may have.
Saturday, April 12, 2008
"One Dollar Nonsense" (A failed Reader's Digest submission)
As a college sophomore I went to Guatemala for a 6-week Spanish course. Upon arriving, I discovered three mistakes in my planning: insufficient funds, no jacket, and no razors. Fortunately, another student from my college would be arriving in a week, so the prospects of correcting my errors seemed strong.
As fate would have it, I was unable to speak to Steve directly. A guy on his hall took the call and assured me he would deliver my message. Lacking other options, I made my requests and asked him to repeat them. “Bring a warm jacket from my closet. Go to Mr. “O’s” office and ask him for an advance of $100 from my school account, and buy me some razor blades.” Assured that the message was in safe hands, I awaited Steve’s arrival.
After greeting him at the airport, I asked Steve if he had brought everything I requested. He responded, “Well, here’s your jacket, but I went to Mr. “O’s” office and he didn’t know anything about where to buy $1.00 razors.”
As fate would have it, I was unable to speak to Steve directly. A guy on his hall took the call and assured me he would deliver my message. Lacking other options, I made my requests and asked him to repeat them. “Bring a warm jacket from my closet. Go to Mr. “O’s” office and ask him for an advance of $100 from my school account, and buy me some razor blades.” Assured that the message was in safe hands, I awaited Steve’s arrival.
After greeting him at the airport, I asked Steve if he had brought everything I requested. He responded, “Well, here’s your jacket, but I went to Mr. “O’s” office and he didn’t know anything about where to buy $1.00 razors.”
Book Review: American Foreign Policy in a New Era (Robert Jervis)
The Bush Doctrine: Enabling Factors, Foundational Pillars, and Future Prospects [Review written in July 2006]
American Foreign Policy in a New Era. By Robert Jervis. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2005. 184p.
The American response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil ushered in a unique era of American foreign policy. Named the Bush Doctrine, this new policy paradigm is criticized by liberals for its unilateralism and by realists for its tendency towards moralism. In American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Robert Jervis discusses the foundational elements of the doctrine, the systemic conditions that made it possible and the prospects for its long-term health as a framework for US foreign policy. Unlike many who prefer to believe the Bush Doctrine is simply the product of an inept Executive, Jervis believes it is remarkably coherent and deserves to be taken seriously. Although he openly admits an aversion to most of the administration’s foreign policy positions, he intentionally avoids condemning the doctrine for the sake of understanding it. This ability to separate his own political views from his analytical process adds value to his efforts and makes this an invaluable read for students of international politics. (Introduction)
Jervis believes the state of the international system best explains the creation of the Bush Doctrine. The key reality that facilitates the policy is the idea that the US, Europe and Japan form a security community in which the very possibility of war with each other is now “inconceivable.” Even though the material and military power of the United States dwarf the capabilities of all others in the Community, the perceived benign nature of American power has allowed these states to make trade and economic interdependence their priority, while allowing US power to provide for their international security needs. This is not to say that the US enjoys an unfettered ability to pursue its own policies; on the contrary, other states within the community do their best to constrain the US as a means to preserve their own values. Nevertheless, Jervis contends that even when disagreement is at its most intense levels, military conflict is no longer an option. (Chapters 1, 3, 5)
Proceeding from this systemic understanding is the idea that the geopolitical climate was ripe for the exercise of American hegemonic power. The terror attacks on US soil altered the American world view and provided the motivation and rationale for the Bush administration to develop a more assertive national security doctrine. This doctrine was conceived from three romantic ideals held by the administration – the allure of American values as universal, “the expected power of positive examples,” and a firm belief in the possibility of progress. From these idealistic beginnings sprang the four doctrinal pillars: the determined promotion of democracy and liberalism abroad, the willingness to engage in preventive war to mitigate threats, the political will to act unilaterally when necessary, and the belief that peace and stability require the assertion of US primacy in world politics. (Chapters 4-5)
Jervis systematically takes exception to each of these objectives. First, he strongly doubts the US will vigorously support the establishment of democracies abroad. He supports this claim by arguing that historically the US has seldom pressed for democracy when it might destabilize a friendly regime, and punctuates his argument with post-9/11 examples of the US embracing undesirable regimes in exchange for access to military bases. Secondly, Jervis sees three main obstacles to the viability of preventive war: vital information is hard to obtain because the threat is not imminent, available information can be difficult to interpret, and most importantly, preventive war will need to be repeated when other situations reach similar thresholds. This last obstacle is particularly problematic, for with the passage of time domestic priorities are more likely to reassert themselves. (Chapters 4-5)
Jervis responds to the third pillar in an unexpected way. In spite of the fact that he claims US unilateralism has alienated our allies and will contribute to a type of counterbalancing effort, he also makes the bold admission that “what critics call unilateralism often is effective leadership.” (88) To be sure, he does not endorse the perceived unilateralism of the Bush administration, but even so, this statement reflects his awareness of the US position in the international system. In fact, given his acknowledgement that this portion of the Bush Doctrine enjoys significant domestic support, it may be that he worries about the costs to the American public as much as the potential damage it may cause to international relationships. Finally, Jervis believes the combination of unilateralism and assertive hegemony alienates our allies and results in much lower levels of cooperation on a wide range of endeavors. (Chapters 4-5)
In summarizing the Bush Doctrine and articulating both the enabling circumstances and political rationale driving the actions of the Bush administration, Jervis has done a remarkable job. On the other hand, a couple of his views could have dangerous implications if proven untrue. One of these stems from his wholehearted endorsement of the Security Community as having progressed beyond the possibility of war. Although it is important to note he makes a caveat that the world system can change quickly, it seems he promotes what might be labeled a “security community exceptionalism” when he insists that military conflict is no longer even conceivable between members. This optimistic liberal outlook is further pronounced by his claim that only a conflict between its members could potentially undermine the idea that “attributes of humans and societies which are often seen as inevitably producing wars in fact do not have to do so.” (35) (Chapter 1)
Jervis also potentially misses the mark when he downplays the significance of terrorism in two particular ways: first, short of a biological attack, no terrorist can inflict the damage of even standard warfare, and second, terror remains a tactic, not an enemy. Regarding his first claim, much ado has been made in recent months concerning US combat deaths in Iraq passing the 2500 mark. This is obviously a significant total, but it is a result of three years of conventional warfare in a foreign land. Terrorists on September 11th managed to kill nearly 3000 people in one day, which seems sufficient to cast doubt on both of Jervis’s claims. If terror is just a tactic, and biological weapons terrorism’s only real threat, how do we account for the mass casualties received in the first attack on the American homeland in the history of modern warfare? (Chapter 2)
With the possible exception of the examples above, Jervis is able to deliver on his intention to seek understanding and avoid projecting his own political orientation into his analysis; nevertheless, it would be impossible to mistake his conclusions. Not only is he concerned that the combination of realist views of power and liberal views of democratization may have unintended consequences that could represent a real danger to American interests, he also believes American intervention in Iraq has damaged America’s reputation in the world and limited a return to pre-9/11 influence among the international community. While it is important to note that in most cases Jervis seems willing to attach legitimacy to the rationality behind the Bush Doctrine, he ultimately concludes it will implode under its own weight. Considering the ambitious objectives of the mandate, the need to sustain international cooperation, and reliance upon domestic support, he may just be correct.
American Foreign Policy in a New Era. By Robert Jervis. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2005. 184p.
The American response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil ushered in a unique era of American foreign policy. Named the Bush Doctrine, this new policy paradigm is criticized by liberals for its unilateralism and by realists for its tendency towards moralism. In American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Robert Jervis discusses the foundational elements of the doctrine, the systemic conditions that made it possible and the prospects for its long-term health as a framework for US foreign policy. Unlike many who prefer to believe the Bush Doctrine is simply the product of an inept Executive, Jervis believes it is remarkably coherent and deserves to be taken seriously. Although he openly admits an aversion to most of the administration’s foreign policy positions, he intentionally avoids condemning the doctrine for the sake of understanding it. This ability to separate his own political views from his analytical process adds value to his efforts and makes this an invaluable read for students of international politics. (Introduction)
Jervis believes the state of the international system best explains the creation of the Bush Doctrine. The key reality that facilitates the policy is the idea that the US, Europe and Japan form a security community in which the very possibility of war with each other is now “inconceivable.” Even though the material and military power of the United States dwarf the capabilities of all others in the Community, the perceived benign nature of American power has allowed these states to make trade and economic interdependence their priority, while allowing US power to provide for their international security needs. This is not to say that the US enjoys an unfettered ability to pursue its own policies; on the contrary, other states within the community do their best to constrain the US as a means to preserve their own values. Nevertheless, Jervis contends that even when disagreement is at its most intense levels, military conflict is no longer an option. (Chapters 1, 3, 5)
Proceeding from this systemic understanding is the idea that the geopolitical climate was ripe for the exercise of American hegemonic power. The terror attacks on US soil altered the American world view and provided the motivation and rationale for the Bush administration to develop a more assertive national security doctrine. This doctrine was conceived from three romantic ideals held by the administration – the allure of American values as universal, “the expected power of positive examples,” and a firm belief in the possibility of progress. From these idealistic beginnings sprang the four doctrinal pillars: the determined promotion of democracy and liberalism abroad, the willingness to engage in preventive war to mitigate threats, the political will to act unilaterally when necessary, and the belief that peace and stability require the assertion of US primacy in world politics. (Chapters 4-5)
Jervis systematically takes exception to each of these objectives. First, he strongly doubts the US will vigorously support the establishment of democracies abroad. He supports this claim by arguing that historically the US has seldom pressed for democracy when it might destabilize a friendly regime, and punctuates his argument with post-9/11 examples of the US embracing undesirable regimes in exchange for access to military bases. Secondly, Jervis sees three main obstacles to the viability of preventive war: vital information is hard to obtain because the threat is not imminent, available information can be difficult to interpret, and most importantly, preventive war will need to be repeated when other situations reach similar thresholds. This last obstacle is particularly problematic, for with the passage of time domestic priorities are more likely to reassert themselves. (Chapters 4-5)
Jervis responds to the third pillar in an unexpected way. In spite of the fact that he claims US unilateralism has alienated our allies and will contribute to a type of counterbalancing effort, he also makes the bold admission that “what critics call unilateralism often is effective leadership.” (88) To be sure, he does not endorse the perceived unilateralism of the Bush administration, but even so, this statement reflects his awareness of the US position in the international system. In fact, given his acknowledgement that this portion of the Bush Doctrine enjoys significant domestic support, it may be that he worries about the costs to the American public as much as the potential damage it may cause to international relationships. Finally, Jervis believes the combination of unilateralism and assertive hegemony alienates our allies and results in much lower levels of cooperation on a wide range of endeavors. (Chapters 4-5)
In summarizing the Bush Doctrine and articulating both the enabling circumstances and political rationale driving the actions of the Bush administration, Jervis has done a remarkable job. On the other hand, a couple of his views could have dangerous implications if proven untrue. One of these stems from his wholehearted endorsement of the Security Community as having progressed beyond the possibility of war. Although it is important to note he makes a caveat that the world system can change quickly, it seems he promotes what might be labeled a “security community exceptionalism” when he insists that military conflict is no longer even conceivable between members. This optimistic liberal outlook is further pronounced by his claim that only a conflict between its members could potentially undermine the idea that “attributes of humans and societies which are often seen as inevitably producing wars in fact do not have to do so.” (35) (Chapter 1)
Jervis also potentially misses the mark when he downplays the significance of terrorism in two particular ways: first, short of a biological attack, no terrorist can inflict the damage of even standard warfare, and second, terror remains a tactic, not an enemy. Regarding his first claim, much ado has been made in recent months concerning US combat deaths in Iraq passing the 2500 mark. This is obviously a significant total, but it is a result of three years of conventional warfare in a foreign land. Terrorists on September 11th managed to kill nearly 3000 people in one day, which seems sufficient to cast doubt on both of Jervis’s claims. If terror is just a tactic, and biological weapons terrorism’s only real threat, how do we account for the mass casualties received in the first attack on the American homeland in the history of modern warfare? (Chapter 2)
With the possible exception of the examples above, Jervis is able to deliver on his intention to seek understanding and avoid projecting his own political orientation into his analysis; nevertheless, it would be impossible to mistake his conclusions. Not only is he concerned that the combination of realist views of power and liberal views of democratization may have unintended consequences that could represent a real danger to American interests, he also believes American intervention in Iraq has damaged America’s reputation in the world and limited a return to pre-9/11 influence among the international community. While it is important to note that in most cases Jervis seems willing to attach legitimacy to the rationality behind the Bush Doctrine, he ultimately concludes it will implode under its own weight. Considering the ambitious objectives of the mandate, the need to sustain international cooperation, and reliance upon domestic support, he may just be correct.
Musings: In Pursuit of the Extraordinary
The pursuit of excellence leads us to a revolving door; the entrance is marked “commitment;” the exit “sacrifice.” Commitment is the intellectual assent of the will; sacrifice merely confirms commitment’s existence. Although commitment and sacrifice go hand in hand, commitment is always the prime mover. Be committed, make the appropriate sacrifices, and you will achieve the extraordinary! [I recorded these thoughts while reading Bruce Wilkinson's book, "The Dream Giver."]
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