Book Review: America at the Crossroads (Francis Fukuyama)

Fukuyama’s “Realistic Wilsonianism:” Foreign Policy Model or Therapeutic Exercise? [Review written in July 2006]

America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy. By Francis Fukuyama. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 226p.

In America at the Crossroads, Francis Fukuyama details his rationale for abandoning neoconservatism, provides analysis of the “neoconservative” mishandling of the Iraq War, and posits a new American foreign policy incorporating the best of neoconservative thinking with other existing theories of international relations. Fukuyama implies in his preface that he has two important motives for authoring this work: first, he can no longer be party to the tainted ideology of neoconservatism, and second, he seeks to introduce a new foreign policy model not currently represented in American politics. Although much of his analysis is informative and compelling, Fukuyama ultimately seems distracted by his first proposition and falls short in delivering anything significantly new to the foreign policy debate.

For Fukuyama, the Iraq War symbolized a line of demarcation between his own conception of neoconservative values and the neoconservative establishment. Convinced that the connection between neoconservatism and the Bush administration’s war policy is overstated, he nevertheless believes that because the term is inextricably linked to the administration’s conduct of the war, it is beyond rescue. As a result, he worries that a backlash against the neoconservative agenda will inspire a wholesale return to a realist foreign policy, a prospect he deems inconsistent with the emerging international system. In an effort to prevent this return to realism as the modus operandi in American foreign policy, Fukuyama proposes the model of “realistic Wilsonianism,” a spin-off of neoconservative thought designed to keep America engaged in world affairs while avoiding further alienation in the international community by an overuse of military might. (Preface, Chapters 1, 6-7)

In essence, Fukuyama’s new model begins where neoconservative thought left off, proposing that the internal actions of states – not just their external behavior – are important, that American power is often needed to bring about moral purposes, and that social engineering ought to be approached with great care and humility. The sole neoconservative principle he omits from his model is the traditional skepticism for the potential of international institutions to play a viable role in the promotion of both security and justice. In fact, this tendency towards liberal internationalism is the only major discrepancy between Fukuyama’s “realistic Wilsonianism” and the neoconservatism he claims is no longer viable. Thus, the main difference between neoconservative thinking and the “realistic Wilsonianism” model is that the means by which these goals can be achieved are less dependent on American military power and more reliant upon US influence to help shape international institutions. (Chapters 1, 7)

Part of what Fukuyama envisions in his foreign policy model is a “dramatic demilitarization” of American foreign policy, a toning down of “the war on terrorism” rhetoric, and a wholehearted campaign to promote political and economic development throughout the world – the last which he claims has always been an afterthought of US foreign policy. He seems concerned that unfettered US military power, combined with aggressive democracy promotion tactics such as regime change and nation-building, will lead to a decline of American influence in the world. To counteract this potentially undesirable loss of American prestige, Fukuyama believes it is essential that US policymakers not only support current international institutions, but also that they create new organizations, coalitions, and institutions to meet a broad range of potential needs for the future. (Chapter 6-7)

Fukuyama’s focus on international institutions is interesting given his own admission of the conundrum of political legitimacy, the idea that formal international institutions perceived as legitimate are hopelessly inefficient while efficient forms of international cooperation often lack legitimacy. This apparent drawback to institutions does not dissuade him from proposing a foreign policy agenda of “multi-multilateralism,” defined as “a large number of overlapping and sometimes competitive international institutions.” (158) His main argument for this approach is couched in the belief that more institutions will provide policymakers with more options, citing as an example the US collaborating with NATO when Russia vetoed action against Kosovo in the UN Security Council. On this basis, Fukuyama calls for a “multiplicity of organizations” in order to be prepared for all different types of challenges to world order in the future. (Chapter 6)

It is clear that Fukuyama’s explanation of “realistic Wilsonianism” is a cohesive and comprehensive foreign policy strategy worthy of consideration. What is less clear, and appears hard to defend, is his claim that he is offering a model “not captured by any existing schools within the US foreign policy debate” when the majority of his principles are supplied by the ideology he supposedly is abandoning, and additional principles are “borrowed” from existing theories. In this respect, it seems he has confused adoption with creation, and adaptation with innovation. Another problematic feature is his apparent failure to explain the logic for his transformation on the issue of international institutions. Prior to the Iraq War, Fukuyama presumably held a more pessimistic view towards the value of international institutions; nevertheless, while he deftly outlines his disagreements with the war, he fails to explain how the Iraq War altered his views of institutions. This begs the question, on what basis did the Iraq War change his opinion and what exactly was so compelling that it warranted a new foreign policy model? Because this rationale is missing, so also is an important analytical tool for assessing the merits of his policy.

Although academics and policy makers alike may profit from a reading of Fukuyama’s book, the likely beneficiaries of America at the Crossroads will be students with little knowledge of the neoconservative tradition, political partisans who are intrigued by the critique of neoconservatism from a former “neocon,” and perhaps, political moderates seeking a fair assessment of the Bush administration’s conduct of the Iraq War. For readers in these categories there will be substantial “food for thought,” but those expecting to encounter a brand new foreign policy model may well be disappointed. Given the disconnect between what the author claims to be doing (creating a new foreign policy) and what he is actually doing (borrowing from existing foreign policies) one wonders whether Fukuyama, horrified by the aggressive policies of his neoconservative colleagues, simply needed a therapeutic venue to exorcise his own demons.

In assessing his historical narrative of neoconservative roots, his analysis of the misapplication of neoconservative principles in the Iraq War, and his criticisms of US insulation from international sentiment, it is clear that Fukuyama’s initial objective to overtly split from neoconservatism has been realized. On the other hand, far from presenting an essential new foreign policy model for the consideration of the academic and policy-making community, Fukuyama has really just done what moderate and independent-minded Americans do all the time. He has considered what the “smorgasbord of ideologies” has to offer and has piecemealed together a foreign policy strategy that he believes is more viable. There is little doubt he has done a better job than most would, but what remains is little more than a stepchild of neoconservatism, not the cutting edge foreign policy model he promised.

Book Review: American Foreign Policy in a New Era (Robert Jervis)

The Bush Doctrine: Enabling Factors, Foundational Pillars, and Future Prospects [Review written in July 2006]

American Foreign Policy in a New Era. By Robert Jervis. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2005. 184p.

The American response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil ushered in a unique era of American foreign policy. Named the Bush Doctrine, this new policy paradigm is criticized by liberals for its unilateralism and by realists for its tendency towards moralism. In American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Robert Jervis discusses the foundational elements of the doctrine, the systemic conditions that made it possible and the prospects for its long-term health as a framework for US foreign policy. Unlike many who prefer to believe the Bush Doctrine is simply the product of an inept Executive, Jervis believes it is remarkably coherent and deserves to be taken seriously. Although he openly admits an aversion to most of the administration’s foreign policy positions, he intentionally avoids condemning the doctrine for the sake of understanding it. This ability to separate his own political views from his analytical process adds value to his efforts and makes this an invaluable read for students of international politics. (Introduction)

Jervis believes the state of the international system best explains the creation of the Bush Doctrine. The key reality that facilitates the policy is the idea that the US, Europe and Japan form a security community in which the very possibility of war with each other is now “inconceivable.” Even though the material and military power of the United States dwarf the capabilities of all others in the Community, the perceived benign nature of American power has allowed these states to make trade and economic interdependence their priority, while allowing US power to provide for their international security needs. This is not to say that the US enjoys an unfettered ability to pursue its own policies; on the contrary, other states within the community do their best to constrain the US as a means to preserve their own values. Nevertheless, Jervis contends that even when disagreement is at its most intense levels, military conflict is no longer an option. (Chapters 1, 3, 5)

Proceeding from this systemic understanding is the idea that the geopolitical climate was ripe for the exercise of American hegemonic power. The terror attacks on US soil altered the American world view and provided the motivation and rationale for the Bush administration to develop a more assertive national security doctrine. This doctrine was conceived from three romantic ideals held by the administration – the allure of American values as universal, “the expected power of positive examples,” and a firm belief in the possibility of progress. From these idealistic beginnings sprang the four doctrinal pillars: the determined promotion of democracy and liberalism abroad, the willingness to engage in preventive war to mitigate threats, the political will to act unilaterally when necessary, and the belief that peace and stability require the assertion of US primacy in world politics. (Chapters 4-5)

Jervis systematically takes exception to each of these objectives. First, he strongly doubts the US will vigorously support the establishment of democracies abroad. He supports this claim by arguing that historically the US has seldom pressed for democracy when it might destabilize a friendly regime, and punctuates his argument with post-9/11 examples of the US embracing undesirable regimes in exchange for access to military bases. Secondly, Jervis sees three main obstacles to the viability of preventive war: vital information is hard to obtain because the threat is not imminent, available information can be difficult to interpret, and most importantly, preventive war will need to be repeated when other situations reach similar thresholds. This last obstacle is particularly problematic, for with the passage of time domestic priorities are more likely to reassert themselves. (Chapters 4-5)

Jervis responds to the third pillar in an unexpected way. In spite of the fact that he claims US unilateralism has alienated our allies and will contribute to a type of counterbalancing effort, he also makes the bold admission that “what critics call unilateralism often is effective leadership.” (88) To be sure, he does not endorse the perceived unilateralism of the Bush administration, but even so, this statement reflects his awareness of the US position in the international system. In fact, given his acknowledgement that this portion of the Bush Doctrine enjoys significant domestic support, it may be that he worries about the costs to the American public as much as the potential damage it may cause to international relationships. Finally, Jervis believes the combination of unilateralism and assertive hegemony alienates our allies and results in much lower levels of cooperation on a wide range of endeavors. (Chapters 4-5)

In summarizing the Bush Doctrine and articulating both the enabling circumstances and political rationale driving the actions of the Bush administration, Jervis has done a remarkable job. On the other hand, a couple of his views could have dangerous implications if proven untrue. One of these stems from his wholehearted endorsement of the Security Community as having progressed beyond the possibility of war. Although it is important to note he makes a caveat that the world system can change quickly, it seems he promotes what might be labeled a “security community exceptionalism” when he insists that military conflict is no longer even conceivable between members. This optimistic liberal outlook is further pronounced by his claim that only a conflict between its members could potentially undermine the idea that “attributes of humans and societies which are often seen as inevitably producing wars in fact do not have to do so.” (35) (Chapter 1)

Jervis also potentially misses the mark when he downplays the significance of terrorism in two particular ways: first, short of a biological attack, no terrorist can inflict the damage of even standard warfare, and second, terror remains a tactic, not an enemy. Regarding his first claim, much ado has been made in recent months concerning US combat deaths in Iraq passing the 2500 mark. This is obviously a significant total, but it is a result of three years of conventional warfare in a foreign land. Terrorists on September 11th managed to kill nearly 3000 people in one day, which seems sufficient to cast doubt on both of Jervis’s claims. If terror is just a tactic, and biological weapons terrorism’s only real threat, how do we account for the mass casualties received in the first attack on the American homeland in the history of modern warfare? (Chapter 2)

With the possible exception of the examples above, Jervis is able to deliver on his intention to seek understanding and avoid projecting his own political orientation into his analysis; nevertheless, it would be impossible to mistake his conclusions. Not only is he concerned that the combination of realist views of power and liberal views of democratization may have unintended consequences that could represent a real danger to American interests, he also believes American intervention in Iraq has damaged America’s reputation in the world and limited a return to pre-9/11 influence among the international community. While it is important to note that in most cases Jervis seems willing to attach legitimacy to the rationality behind the Bush Doctrine, he ultimately concludes it will implode under its own weight. Considering the ambitious objectives of the mandate, the need to sustain international cooperation, and reliance upon domestic support, he may just be correct.