The Bush Doctrine: Enabling Factors, Foundational Pillars, and Future Prospects [Review written in July 2006]
American Foreign Policy in a New Era. By Robert Jervis. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2005. 184p.
The American response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil ushered in a unique era of American foreign policy. Named the Bush Doctrine, this new policy paradigm is criticized by liberals for its unilateralism and by realists for its tendency towards moralism. In American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Robert Jervis discusses the foundational elements of the doctrine, the systemic conditions that made it possible and the prospects for its long-term health as a framework for US foreign policy. Unlike many who prefer to believe the Bush Doctrine is simply the product of an inept Executive, Jervis believes it is remarkably coherent and deserves to be taken seriously. Although he openly admits an aversion to most of the administration’s foreign policy positions, he intentionally avoids condemning the doctrine for the sake of understanding it. This ability to separate his own political views from his analytical process adds value to his efforts and makes this an invaluable read for students of international politics. (Introduction)
Jervis believes the state of the international system best explains the creation of the Bush Doctrine. The key reality that facilitates the policy is the idea that the US, Europe and Japan form a security community in which the very possibility of war with each other is now “inconceivable.” Even though the material and military power of the United States dwarf the capabilities of all others in the Community, the perceived benign nature of American power has allowed these states to make trade and economic interdependence their priority, while allowing US power to provide for their international security needs. This is not to say that the US enjoys an unfettered ability to pursue its own policies; on the contrary, other states within the community do their best to constrain the US as a means to preserve their own values. Nevertheless, Jervis contends that even when disagreement is at its most intense levels, military conflict is no longer an option. (Chapters 1, 3, 5)
Proceeding from this systemic understanding is the idea that the geopolitical climate was ripe for the exercise of American hegemonic power. The terror attacks on US soil altered the American world view and provided the motivation and rationale for the Bush administration to develop a more assertive national security doctrine. This doctrine was conceived from three romantic ideals held by the administration – the allure of American values as universal, “the expected power of positive examples,” and a firm belief in the possibility of progress. From these idealistic beginnings sprang the four doctrinal pillars: the determined promotion of democracy and liberalism abroad, the willingness to engage in preventive war to mitigate threats, the political will to act unilaterally when necessary, and the belief that peace and stability require the assertion of US primacy in world politics. (Chapters 4-5)
Jervis systematically takes exception to each of these objectives. First, he strongly doubts the US will vigorously support the establishment of democracies abroad. He supports this claim by arguing that historically the US has seldom pressed for democracy when it might destabilize a friendly regime, and punctuates his argument with post-9/11 examples of the US embracing undesirable regimes in exchange for access to military bases. Secondly, Jervis sees three main obstacles to the viability of preventive war: vital information is hard to obtain because the threat is not imminent, available information can be difficult to interpret, and most importantly, preventive war will need to be repeated when other situations reach similar thresholds. This last obstacle is particularly problematic, for with the passage of time domestic priorities are more likely to reassert themselves. (Chapters 4-5)
Jervis responds to the third pillar in an unexpected way. In spite of the fact that he claims US unilateralism has alienated our allies and will contribute to a type of counterbalancing effort, he also makes the bold admission that “what critics call unilateralism often is effective leadership.” (88) To be sure, he does not endorse the perceived unilateralism of the Bush administration, but even so, this statement reflects his awareness of the US position in the international system. In fact, given his acknowledgement that this portion of the Bush Doctrine enjoys significant domestic support, it may be that he worries about the costs to the American public as much as the potential damage it may cause to international relationships. Finally, Jervis believes the combination of unilateralism and assertive hegemony alienates our allies and results in much lower levels of cooperation on a wide range of endeavors. (Chapters 4-5)
In summarizing the Bush Doctrine and articulating both the enabling circumstances and political rationale driving the actions of the Bush administration, Jervis has done a remarkable job. On the other hand, a couple of his views could have dangerous implications if proven untrue. One of these stems from his wholehearted endorsement of the Security Community as having progressed beyond the possibility of war. Although it is important to note he makes a caveat that the world system can change quickly, it seems he promotes what might be labeled a “security community exceptionalism” when he insists that military conflict is no longer even conceivable between members. This optimistic liberal outlook is further pronounced by his claim that only a conflict between its members could potentially undermine the idea that “attributes of humans and societies which are often seen as inevitably producing wars in fact do not have to do so.” (35) (Chapter 1)
Jervis also potentially misses the mark when he downplays the significance of terrorism in two particular ways: first, short of a biological attack, no terrorist can inflict the damage of even standard warfare, and second, terror remains a tactic, not an enemy. Regarding his first claim, much ado has been made in recent months concerning US combat deaths in Iraq passing the 2500 mark. This is obviously a significant total, but it is a result of three years of conventional warfare in a foreign land. Terrorists on September 11th managed to kill nearly 3000 people in one day, which seems sufficient to cast doubt on both of Jervis’s claims. If terror is just a tactic, and biological weapons terrorism’s only real threat, how do we account for the mass casualties received in the first attack on the American homeland in the history of modern warfare? (Chapter 2)
With the possible exception of the examples above, Jervis is able to deliver on his intention to seek understanding and avoid projecting his own political orientation into his analysis; nevertheless, it would be impossible to mistake his conclusions. Not only is he concerned that the combination of realist views of power and liberal views of democratization may have unintended consequences that could represent a real danger to American interests, he also believes American intervention in Iraq has damaged America’s reputation in the world and limited a return to pre-9/11 influence among the international community. While it is important to note that in most cases Jervis seems willing to attach legitimacy to the rationality behind the Bush Doctrine, he ultimately concludes it will implode under its own weight. Considering the ambitious objectives of the mandate, the need to sustain international cooperation, and reliance upon domestic support, he may just be correct.
American Foreign Policy in a New Era. By Robert Jervis. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2005. 184p.
The American response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil ushered in a unique era of American foreign policy. Named the Bush Doctrine, this new policy paradigm is criticized by liberals for its unilateralism and by realists for its tendency towards moralism. In American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Robert Jervis discusses the foundational elements of the doctrine, the systemic conditions that made it possible and the prospects for its long-term health as a framework for US foreign policy. Unlike many who prefer to believe the Bush Doctrine is simply the product of an inept Executive, Jervis believes it is remarkably coherent and deserves to be taken seriously. Although he openly admits an aversion to most of the administration’s foreign policy positions, he intentionally avoids condemning the doctrine for the sake of understanding it. This ability to separate his own political views from his analytical process adds value to his efforts and makes this an invaluable read for students of international politics. (Introduction)
Jervis believes the state of the international system best explains the creation of the Bush Doctrine. The key reality that facilitates the policy is the idea that the US, Europe and Japan form a security community in which the very possibility of war with each other is now “inconceivable.” Even though the material and military power of the United States dwarf the capabilities of all others in the Community, the perceived benign nature of American power has allowed these states to make trade and economic interdependence their priority, while allowing US power to provide for their international security needs. This is not to say that the US enjoys an unfettered ability to pursue its own policies; on the contrary, other states within the community do their best to constrain the US as a means to preserve their own values. Nevertheless, Jervis contends that even when disagreement is at its most intense levels, military conflict is no longer an option. (Chapters 1, 3, 5)
Proceeding from this systemic understanding is the idea that the geopolitical climate was ripe for the exercise of American hegemonic power. The terror attacks on US soil altered the American world view and provided the motivation and rationale for the Bush administration to develop a more assertive national security doctrine. This doctrine was conceived from three romantic ideals held by the administration – the allure of American values as universal, “the expected power of positive examples,” and a firm belief in the possibility of progress. From these idealistic beginnings sprang the four doctrinal pillars: the determined promotion of democracy and liberalism abroad, the willingness to engage in preventive war to mitigate threats, the political will to act unilaterally when necessary, and the belief that peace and stability require the assertion of US primacy in world politics. (Chapters 4-5)
Jervis systematically takes exception to each of these objectives. First, he strongly doubts the US will vigorously support the establishment of democracies abroad. He supports this claim by arguing that historically the US has seldom pressed for democracy when it might destabilize a friendly regime, and punctuates his argument with post-9/11 examples of the US embracing undesirable regimes in exchange for access to military bases. Secondly, Jervis sees three main obstacles to the viability of preventive war: vital information is hard to obtain because the threat is not imminent, available information can be difficult to interpret, and most importantly, preventive war will need to be repeated when other situations reach similar thresholds. This last obstacle is particularly problematic, for with the passage of time domestic priorities are more likely to reassert themselves. (Chapters 4-5)
Jervis responds to the third pillar in an unexpected way. In spite of the fact that he claims US unilateralism has alienated our allies and will contribute to a type of counterbalancing effort, he also makes the bold admission that “what critics call unilateralism often is effective leadership.” (88) To be sure, he does not endorse the perceived unilateralism of the Bush administration, but even so, this statement reflects his awareness of the US position in the international system. In fact, given his acknowledgement that this portion of the Bush Doctrine enjoys significant domestic support, it may be that he worries about the costs to the American public as much as the potential damage it may cause to international relationships. Finally, Jervis believes the combination of unilateralism and assertive hegemony alienates our allies and results in much lower levels of cooperation on a wide range of endeavors. (Chapters 4-5)
In summarizing the Bush Doctrine and articulating both the enabling circumstances and political rationale driving the actions of the Bush administration, Jervis has done a remarkable job. On the other hand, a couple of his views could have dangerous implications if proven untrue. One of these stems from his wholehearted endorsement of the Security Community as having progressed beyond the possibility of war. Although it is important to note he makes a caveat that the world system can change quickly, it seems he promotes what might be labeled a “security community exceptionalism” when he insists that military conflict is no longer even conceivable between members. This optimistic liberal outlook is further pronounced by his claim that only a conflict between its members could potentially undermine the idea that “attributes of humans and societies which are often seen as inevitably producing wars in fact do not have to do so.” (35) (Chapter 1)
Jervis also potentially misses the mark when he downplays the significance of terrorism in two particular ways: first, short of a biological attack, no terrorist can inflict the damage of even standard warfare, and second, terror remains a tactic, not an enemy. Regarding his first claim, much ado has been made in recent months concerning US combat deaths in Iraq passing the 2500 mark. This is obviously a significant total, but it is a result of three years of conventional warfare in a foreign land. Terrorists on September 11th managed to kill nearly 3000 people in one day, which seems sufficient to cast doubt on both of Jervis’s claims. If terror is just a tactic, and biological weapons terrorism’s only real threat, how do we account for the mass casualties received in the first attack on the American homeland in the history of modern warfare? (Chapter 2)
With the possible exception of the examples above, Jervis is able to deliver on his intention to seek understanding and avoid projecting his own political orientation into his analysis; nevertheless, it would be impossible to mistake his conclusions. Not only is he concerned that the combination of realist views of power and liberal views of democratization may have unintended consequences that could represent a real danger to American interests, he also believes American intervention in Iraq has damaged America’s reputation in the world and limited a return to pre-9/11 influence among the international community. While it is important to note that in most cases Jervis seems willing to attach legitimacy to the rationality behind the Bush Doctrine, he ultimately concludes it will implode under its own weight. Considering the ambitious objectives of the mandate, the need to sustain international cooperation, and reliance upon domestic support, he may just be correct.
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